While security vulnerability research can expose technical weaknesses that may be exploited, incident research provides
in-depth information about the most common targets, motives and attack vectors of modern hackers.
And where better to turn for a sense of where we stand today than the Web Hacking Incidents Database (WHID). Analysis of WHID
reveals that in 2009 social networks were at the greatest risk, malware and defacement remained the most common outcome of
Web attacks, and SQL injection was the most common attack vector. Here's a deeper dive on the findings and what you can do
about them.
Perhaps not surprisingly, analysis of Web hacking incidents reveals that social network sites such as Twitter and Facebook
are becoming premier targets for hackers. One in five incidents (19%) between January and June 2009 targeted social network
sites, making them the most commonly attacked market.
Many attacks on social networks involve cross-site scripting (XSS) worms. Additionally, insufficient anti-automation controls
permit hackers to brute force attack log-in credentials. In one incident, an attacker accessed a Twitter Admin account that
had a password reset tool and compromised 33 high-profile accounts, including President Obama's.
Web attacks are driven by crime. Most occur because the hacker wants money, not glory. However, in some instances, the attacks
are performed by professionals seeking to advance a cause.
In 2009, defacement of Web sites was still the number one driver for Web hacking (28%). Defacement includes visible changes
and covert changes, such as the planting of malicious code. Criminals exploit Web application vulnerabilities to plant malware
that subsequently infects clients who visit the Web site. The hacked sites become the hacker's primary method of distributing
viruses, Trojans and root kits.
On the other end of the spectrum, ideologists use the Internet to express themselves using Web hacking to deface Web sites.
The majority of defacement incidents are of a political nature, targeting political parties, candidates and government departments,
typically with a specific message related to a campaign.
Web defacements are a serious problem and a critical barometer for estimating exploitable vulnerabilities in Web sites. Defacement
statistics are valuable since they are one of the few incidents that are publicly facing and thus cannot be easily swept under
the rug.
SQL Injection remains the number one attack vector, accounting for nearly one-fifth of all security breaches (19%). These
attacks alter the contents of the back-end database and inject malicious JavaScript. Interestingly, the overall attack more
closely resembles a XXS methodology, as the end goal of the attack is to have malicious JavaScript execute within victim's
browsers to steal login credentials to other Web applications.
Attack vectors exploiting Web 2.0 features, such as user-contributed content from social media applications, are also commonly
employed: authentication abuse is the second most active attack vector (11%), and cross site request forgery (CSRF) rose to
number five (5%).
While not a new attack vector, attacks that take advantage of insufficient authentication are increasingly severe due to the
proliferation of user-contributed and managed Web sites. This is closely related to CSRF, a vulnerability that was recognized
several years ago as a potentially potent attack vector. While it took longer for CSRF to appear than expected, the rise in
CSRF incidents is in line with authentication abuse since it provides an alternative mechanism for performing actions on behalf
of a victim.
Regardless of the target, motive or vector, Web attacks seek to exploit the connectivity, complexity and extensibility of
the Internet. A lack of input validation, poor database configuration and the priority of new features over security enables
hackers to access sensitive information.
The connectivity of the Internet is a blessing and a curse. HTTP is allowed through virtually every network firewall, opening
up the network to external attackers. HTTP is also a very open protocol, which often integrates XML and SOAP inside to help
facilitate Web service functions. The explosion of Web 2.0 architectures has shattered the traditional network boundaries,
making it even more challenging to secure Web input and output.
Underscoring these issues is the fact that many internal databases are now becoming "Webified" and accessible to external
users. Properly configured databases and SQL construction is critical. Developers that are not trained in secure coding put
too much trust in user input. It is this lack of input validation that enables mass SQL Injection bots to successfully attack
databases.
Finally, the extensibility of Web applications leads to greater vulnerabilities since the priority of features usually comes
before security. All too often "scope creep" comes into play as new widgets, bells and whistles are added in the midst of
the software development life cycle. These additions should require a security review, but this rarely happens. A common complaint
heard by Web application security professionals is that implementing security to an application under development is like
trying to change a tire on a car that is still moving.
It is not enough to know about these incidents and risk factors; you must also understand how to protect the integrity of
Web applications. If you know a hurricane is approaching, it is irresponsible not to shutter your house. Likewise, if you
know Web security incidents are occurring, it is irresponsible not to protect the Web site.
An effective Web security strategy should be able to correlate Web activity to the responsible user, as well as detect abnormal
actions. Additionally, poorly coded applications that are not functioning properly or are leaking sensitive information must
be identified. Finally, operations, security and development teams should be able to quickly conduct proper incident response
by utilizing operation data to trouble shoot problems and remediate identified vulnerabilities.
Companies with these security strategies can be assured they are running a safe and secure site.
Barnett is director of application security research for Breach Security, a SANS Institute faculty member, the OWASP ModSecurity
Core Rule Set (CRS) Project Leader and also a member of the Web Application Security Consortium (WASC) where he leads the
Distributed Open Proxy Honeypot Project.
Source Citation
"The State of Web Security Issues." Network World (2010). Computer Database. Web. 28 Feb. 2010.
Document URL
http://find.galegroup.com/gtx/infomark.do?&contentSet=IAC-Documents&type=retrieve&tabID=T003&prodId=CDB&docId=A219437900&source=gale&srcprod=CDB&userGroupName=broward29&version=1.0
Gale Document Number:A219437900
No comments:
Post a Comment